
Netgator: Malware Detection Using Program Interactive Challenges

Brian Schulte, Haris Andrianakis, Kun
Sun, and Angelos Stavrou

- Increase of stealthy malware in enterprises
 - Obfuscation, polymorphic techniques
- Often uses legitimate communication channels
 - HTTP
 - Volume of traffic makes it difficult to process all communications
 - HTTPS
 - Lack of inspection currently
 - Disguised as legitimate applications

□ Netgator

- Inspection of legitimate ports/protocols
 - Port 80, HTTP/S
- Transparent proxy
- 2 parts
 - Passive
 - Determine type of application
 - Easily catch “dumb” malware
 - Active
 - Challenge based on expected functionality (PICs)

- Focus on HTTP/S, browsers
- Study of 1026 malware samples
 - Out of samples where network activity was observed, ~80% utilized HTTP/S
 - Very high percentage of HTTP/S malware try to masquerade as browsers
 - None passed our challenges

□ PIC

- Challenge comprised of a request and expected response pair
- Communication intercepted
- Response it sent back to exercise known functionality of advertised program
- If expected answer is returned, communication is allowed to pass through
 - If not, drop connection

- 2 pronged approach
 - Passive to classify traffic
 - Active to “challenge” application
- Prototype built using HTML, Javascript, and Flash challenges
- Low overhead
 - 353 ms end-to-end latency

Design and Implementation

- 2 major parts

- Passive
- Active

- Passive


- Establish type of application
 - Browser, VOIP, OS updates, etc...
- Signatures are determined by unique HTTP header orderings

Active Challenge Architecture

- Proxy & ICAP server duo
 - Squid, HTTP/S transparent proxy
 - Greasyspoon, Java based ICAP server

- What is ICAP?
 - Internet Content Adaption Protocol
 - Allows modification of all elements of HTTP request/response
 - Body, headers, URL, etc...

Active Challenge Architecture




Active Challenges

- For known applications, we challenge them based on known functionality
 - For browsers, HTML/Flash/Javascript
- Challenge code comprised of a redirect to the originally requested file with a hash appended as a parameter
- To cut down on overhead, text/html data is challenged on the response

Active Challenges

- Two types
 - Request
 - Response
- Request challenging
 - Stop the initial communication
 - Send back challenge immediately
 - Higher latency, good protection
- Response challenging
 - Allow original response to come back
 - Imbed challenge in original response
 - Lower latency, possibly lower security

Active Challenges – Request Challenge



Active Challenges – Request challenging

- Hash is unique each time
 - Based on time, requesting IP, requested URL, and secret key
- Headers replaced with HTTP response headers
 - Forces the new response back to the client
- Challenge code example, Javascript:


```
<html>
<head>
<script type="text/javascript">
window.location = {URL requested}?=\
                  {hash generated}

</script>
</head>
<body></body>
</html>
```

Active Challenge – Response Challenge

- ❑ Challenging every request at the request would cause a lot of overhead
 - Challenge text/html data at the response
- ❑ Let the original request pass through
 - Insert challenge inside the original response
- ❑ Client gets response and then challenge is processed

Active Challenge – Response Challenge



Active Challenges

- ❑ The hash is what tells the proxy if the application passed the challenge
 - Attacker can just parse out hash
- ❑ Encrypt the hash with a Javascript implementation of AES
- ❑ The challenge that is sent back now contains the code (and key) to decrypt the hash
 - Forces the attacker to have a full Javascript engine to decrypt the hash

Active Challenges – Handling SSL

- Squid's SSL-bump utilized
- Traffic encrypted with Netgator's key
 - Decrypted at proxy for processing
 - Re-encrypted with external site's key when leaving proxy

Active Challenges


- Further cutting down on overhead
 - Automatically pass network requests if the client has passed a challenge for that site's domain
- Client has passed challenge for `www.foo.com`
 - Request for `www.foo.com/bar` passes automatically
- Records are periodically cleaned
 - Avoid malware “piggy-backing” off legitimate client's who passed challenges

Experimental Evaluation

- Used PlanetLab nodes for download tests
- Downloads of 3 different file sizes
 - 10KB, 100KB, 1MB
- 3 challenges types
 - HTML, Javascript, Flash
- Request and Response challenging

Experimental Evaluation

Average End-to-End Latency



Experimental Evaluation

- HTML lowest overhead
- Javascript results
 - Nice middle ground between difficulty to pass challenge and measured overhead
- Flash results
 - Highest overhead
 - Toughest challenge, combines Javascript and Flash
- Response challenge results
 - By far the lowest, lower security though since the original response is let through

Discussion

- Attackers will attempt evasion
 - Using a different user-agent/header signature
 - If unknown, communications are blocked
 - If known, challenge will still be sent

- Some legitimate applications might not be able to have challenges crafted
 - Whitelist can be created

Related Works

- Closest to our work is work by Gu et al.
 - Active botnet probing to identify obscure command and control channels

- Main differences
 - We do not expect nor ever rely on a human to be behind an application's communications
 - Our work focuses on legitimate applications rather than malicious botnets

Related Works

- Our work similar to OS and application fingerprinting
 - Nmap
- CAPTCHA puzzles
 - Instead of focusing on humans, focus on the application
- Traditional botnet detection
 - BotSniffer, BotHunter, BotMiner

Conclusion

□ Netgator

- Inline malware detection system
- 2 parts
 - Passive to classify traffic and thwart “dumb” malware
 - Active to challenge applications identity
 - Program Interactive Challenges
- Fully transparent to the user
- Average latency
 - 353ms for request challenges
 - 24ms for response challenges